Alex Lozupone
It has come to my attention that recent discoveries have brought into question the validity of my meditations. Advances in science, technology, and understanding, have she d a new and interesting light on the nature of the mind, and body. I intend to do two thing s herein: first, to fully evaluate all I have said in my meditations, and show that they still do largely apply, despite questions brought about by recent dis coveries, and second, to address some recent paradoxes of the self.
I have to analyze, then, the question of the identity of the self, relating to three different aspects: the continued-consciousness, the memory, and the body. Of course, we m ust understand what exactly is meant by these terms. Consciousness describes the continuous ex istence and awareness of the self- I know I am now, and I know I will be in two seconds, an d I believe that I am the same being I was two seconds ago. I can sense that this is true. Memory describes the knowledge of previous events- things such as birthdays, school lectures, and so forth. It is not clear whether the memory includes things such as behavior, or other aspects of existence which change, but this will not matter in the determination of where the self lies. B ody describes the physical incarnation of me- my flesh, and perhaps more specifically, my brain.
(I feel it necessary to elaborate on what I mean when I refer to the mind herei n. The mind is defined as that which is not the body- the mental aspects of me.)
I have already shown that the body has nothing to do with the existence of the self; the self can be proven to exist without proving that the body exists, and so we can gath er that the self exists as an entity separate from the body. I will briefly repeat the explanati on.
I think, I am, that much I already know. I do not need to know that the body ex ists in order to show that I exist, thus the body is secondary to my existence; I can show th at I exist only by knowing that I am a thinking being, and need not consider the body at all. Even when I do consider the body, I do not consider it in any way to be similar to me- it is a purely p hysical object. It cannot be that something which is secondary to my existence is my self; therefo re the self must rest somewhere in the mind, rather than the body. So it merely remains to be sh own where the self rests: in the memory or in the consciousness.
It is presumably possible to brainwash people, or perhaps to hypnotize them, so they believe that they lived through events which did not actually occur to them. Th is brings up the concept of the evil demon again, although in a somewhat lighter form. The probl em of knowing that all else exists is not my main concern. Rather, it is claimed that if one were to extract all of my memories, and place them into someone elses brain, then, according to this t heory that the self consists only of memories, they may very well become another me. This seem s unlikely, and I will show this not to be the case- that the self is in absolutely no way corr elated with the memories.
Experiments have been performed which involve sending signals to different part s of the brain, and getting the brain (person) to react in certain ways. This is essenti ally directly pulling on the ropes which I mentioned in my mediation. We know t hat if a certain part of the brain is damaged, movement is hindered. Likewise, if other parts are damaged, we forget certain things. The former presents no problems- it seems obvious that some part of the brain conne cting muscle to mind has been disconnected. The latter, however, implies one of two things. Eit her the memories are stored in the brain, or the memories can only be accessed through that port ion of the brain. It seems unlikely that the mind would have memories, yet be unable to act on th em directly without the brain; thus it seems that the memories must be stored i n the brain itself. I will, however, entertain the possibility that memories ar e stored in the mind for the sake of completeness, and then show that this small point does not even matter.
If the memories are stored in the mind, and not the brain, then we need to dete rmine if the memories are in fact the essence of the self, or if this essence resides in the consciousness. If the memories are in fact stored in the brain, and not a part of the mind, as seems more likely, then we neednt argue any further -- since the brain is a part of the body, and we know that the body is not a part of the self, we know that the only possibility for the self is in the mi nd; and since the mind does not contain the memories or the body, it must only contain the third candi date for existencethe continued consciousness. This is a rather weak proof, however, and I will show that the self lies in the mind much more conclusively.
It can be shown that the memories, no matter where they lie, are not the essenc e of, in any sense, the self. I have existed for as long as I can remember. If I had the men tal resources, I would be able to recall my very first experience. If I could recall this, this recoll ection would of course be my very first memory. Of course, I did exist immediately before I experience d- how could I experience without existing? Thus, I have proven now that I existed for a very short time without ANY memories. Can it be doubted that I am separate from my memories?
To set this claim up in the present tense, I can also state the following. In t en seconds I will recall all which occurred within those ten seconds- my memories are different, yet I am not a different person. Likewise, I often forget things, such as peopl e I know, or where I live, yet this does not make me any less me than I was whe n I fully remembered these things. This can continuously be applied, where each moment I have slightly different memories than previousl y, to show that the memories do indeed constitute none of my actual being -- my self. This can be said not only of memories, but of any qualities associated with me that change. If I am to belie ve that I am one self, then any qualities which are not consistent throughout my existence must not be a part of my self.
I will now elaborate slightly. It is arguable that my memories in a few seconds are a subset of the memories which I had previously. This is true. Similarly, if I forget so mething, it is likely that in a few moments I did not forget everything I know, and so I have a simil ar set of memories. (I might digress here to mention that there are people who suffer from a diseas e which does in fact cause them to forget everything on a daily basis; it would be ridiculous t o argue that they are continually becoming a new self). If we apply this theory of subsets on a broad er scale, we encounter a problem. Continually applying this, over a period of several decade s, will result in a very different set of memories. It is possible that this set is totally differe nt, yet we will not say that the person is a different person. If the set of me mories is not different, then, obviously, there is a small subset of these memo ries, constant throughout the existence, which constitute completely and totall y, the self. This is a preposterous notion- that a small set of memories define a persons being. If we bring back what I mentioned previously- that when I fir st existed, I had no memories, we then see that this small set of memories is the empty set. No one in their right minds would claim that their identity lies in the empty set. (Limit theory, it should be noted, can also be used to show that the physical body is in no way the same physical parts -- the same atoms -- which it was many many years ago. Thus we can disprove the body-as-self theory in such a way)
We have shown that, from any point in time to any other, my memories will be di fferent, and thus will my self. If this is not the case, then it is never the case, as t here is no point at which a series of small changes is anything more. By using limit theory we can easily show this. Then, it can be argued, that yes, these a re all different selves. Apart from the problem that it does not seem logical t hat our identity, or self, is a continuously different thing (and thus we have no real identity or essence), there is the obvious triviality of this- that sin ce the self is continuously changing, it is a totally meaningless concept, sinc e it cannot be applied continuously and practically. We are not searching for t his useless definition of the self -- there is obviously more to it than this, otherwise we would not have such a term.
We have now shown that the self does not lie in the body, nor does it lie in th e memories, nor in fact does it lie in anything that has, or can, change over time. Thus, t he self must lie in whatever is left. By default, we hope that this is the only remaining candidate - the stream of continued consciousness. By definition, in fact, the stream of consciousness is that which is constant throughout ones existence (it being the continued stream of consciousness, it is implied to exist throughout); since i t is the only thing we have found to be constant throughout my existence, it must in fact be my self.
Now, I will explore the recent situations which question the identity of the se lf further. There have been case studies where it was necessary to sever the brain into two pieces, the left brain and the right brain. Evidence also implies that the brain functions actua lly as TWO brains, each serving to perform different thoughts and actions, and each controlling on ly one half of the body. Some say that this questions the minds existence as a single, indivisible entity.
This is, of course, foolish. I have stated in my meditations that the nerves fu nction much like ropes (although the analogy might better be electrical wires, all that was said regarding the ropelike behavior may still be applied). These nerves connect to the brain at v arious points, and the brain connects to the mind. Although it is still not clear where the brain connects to the mind, it is clear that it must connect in two places- this is the only way the body c an still function, given what we know about the interaction of brain-halves and body-halves. When the brain is severed into two, it is much like breaking a computer in half; it is incomplete, and wi ll no longer function as it is supposed to. It is a miracle of functionality and design, then, that a human can function at all in such a state. A computer broken in two will do little for a user, yet a brain broken in two still works rather well for a mind, although it does not fu nction perfectly; this is why it appears that there are two entities. The two b rains serve different communicational purposes, and thus it seems that one half of the brain is used to communicate ideas of creativity to the body, while the other communicates logic. There is still only one mind, but this mind connects to two separate brainhalves which perform different purposes. But wait, you sa y. If the mind is connected to both brain halves, shouldnt they still be aware of each other? No, of course not. The computer analogy still holds. Let us assu me that a mind is a user, and a brain/body a computer. If we break the computer somehow, but still allow it to function partially, the user will be able to ge t some things done. Then, when the computer malfunctions, the user cannot direc tly intervene to fix the computer. Likewise, when the brain isnt working, the mind cannot substitute for part of t he brain -- it will simply have to live with the problem.
This explains also why it is that, in very extreme cases, a persons two halves can appear to disagree with each other. The mind, not being the body, but only being able to send it messages, is attempting to use the body as if it were in perfectly good shape. It sends mess ages to the brain, and the brain, like a computer, is meant to interpret the messages and act acco rdingly. When severed, the brain cannot do this, and the two body halves can conflict. This is not in any way evidence of two minds; it is merely evidence of one mind attempting to control two bodie s, as if they were one. It can be inferred, then, that any conflicts which exist are the resu lt of the two brains being unable to communicate, not the mind being two minds.
This allows much insight into the functions of the brain and mind. Experiments which have been performed support the theory that memories are stored in the brain. A person will be shown an object through one eye, and asked to identify it, but they will not be able to do so. This is because the memory of this object is stored in one half of the brain, yet th e area of the brain which controls speech is in the other half. The mind attempts to get the brain to perform the task, but due to the disconnection of the halves, it cannot do so.
There is also the problem of displacement, or relocation, of the self, and it c omes up in a variety of ways. We have already discussed the idea of a brain cop ying, such that another mans memories are my own. There is also the concept of teleportation. If a method wa s found to read in every atom of my being, and reproduce it elsewhere, annihilating the original c opy of myself, is the new creation still me? What if the original me is not destroyed? Are there once again potentially two mes? Finally, what if, instead of reproducing me atom-by-atom in reality, a computer program were written which would be designed to simulate me, and thus to act exactly like me.
These all present the same problem, and have the same solution. We have shown t hat the self exists entirely in the continued consciousness, and we know that the consc iousness must exist in the mind, and is not a tangible thing. The mind is not only indivisible, but it cannot be analyzed or detected from the physical world. It is impossible to duplicate the mind- it is as feasible as creating rock from nothingness.
Since we cannot effectively reproduce the mind, and thus the self, we can remai n secure that there will be only one of us in existence. Even if it were possible to cre ate a perfect behavioral facsimile of me, it would not be me. This is because i t is not possible to duplicate a stream of consciousness, by definition, and we have shown that it is the stream of continued consciousness which is the essen ce of my self. The newly created me, although it may behave the same, will not have existed throughout the same time that I had. Its consciousness, assuming i t has one, will not be a continuation of my consciousness, because the two are separate entities obviously, and consciousness cannot be split. Since the conti nued consciousness is an actual thing, and not merely a sum of descriptions, it is unique, and thus there can be only one me. (It is no t clear whether such a being would have a mind or not, and if so, where this mind would come from. The entire procedure seems somewhat outlandish to me; since the human mind has an unlimited source o f free will, this new being, in order to be behaviorally similar, would also require a free will, and it is not clear that such a thing can be duplicated in such a w ay. Where would such a free will come from? and how would the two free wills be made to behave the same -- is that not a co ntradiction to free will? Clearly we are dealing with an impossible case, which, even if it were po ssible, I have shown to be insignificant towards questioning the identity of the self)
In conclusion, then, I find that I know somewhat more already stated has been s hown to be true, even in the light of many new discoveries. We can now once again rest ass ured that we are living beings which exist in the mind, where the only threat to us comes throug h the body, in the form of purely physical harm. All doubt of where the self lies in existence has been relinquished, as well as any doubt of its potential duplicity.